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In August 2011, the ratings agency Standard and Poor's downgraded the long-term credit rating of the United States from "AAA" to "A+", even though the US has a default-free record of over two hundred years. In July 2011, another leading ratings agency, Moody's downgraded Ireland, recently an "AAA" country to "Ba1", also known as "junk status". These and other dramatic developments are a reminder that sovereign debt is a political choice. Sovereigns decide whether or not to borrow and they decide whether or not to pay their debts. Sovereign debt, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP, is concentrated in the developed world. However, the literature on the politics of sovereign debt in advanced economies is sparse. Rather, the majority of studies focus emerging economies, which face very different challenges when borrowing on international markets.
By reconsidering the political determinants of sovereign debt in the advanced economies this article fills a major gap in the international political economy literature and directly addresses the current economic and political crisis. We do so by employing one of the most powerful concepts in political economy: credible commitment.
1 In recent decades, this concept has been central to the increasingly successful engagement between international relations, comparative politics and economics. We test a series of hypotheses about political structures and sovereign debt. These hypotheses are derived from the theory of credible commitment, as well as research on the impact of political ideology and flexible policy-making. We argue that power-sharing institutions and party system polarisation have important effects on long-term interest rates. Where polarisation is low and collective responsibility is high the market perceives a more credible commitment on the part of sovereign 1 Kydland and Prescott 1977. debtors. This credibility argument outperforms alternative accounts of the politics of sovereign debt, namely a market preference for right-wing governments and more flexible polities. The data consists of a panel of twenty three rich countries between 1970 and 2009. Our dependent variable is long-term government bond yield and we control for a vector of conventional economic variables.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on sovereign debt.
Second, we argue that studies of sovereign debt in developed economies should be anchored within the wider political economy literature that emphasises institutions, political competition, and credible commitments. The third section applies these ideas to the problem of sovereign debt and derives hypotheses. Fourth, we test the hypotheses on a panel dataset. Fifth, we conduct a range of robustness tests. The sixth and final section is the conclusion.
The Sovereign Debt Literature
Politics plays a central role in rating agencies' assessments of sovereign debt.
Standard and Poor's emphasises how sovereign debt differs from other types of debt:
'Willingness to pay is a qualitative issue that distinguishes sovereigns from most other types of issuers. Partly because creditors have only limited legal redress, a government can (and sometimes does) default selectively on its obligations even when it possesses the financial capacity for timely debt service'.
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In keeping with this emphasis, political risk is the first of the nine sets of criteria used to decide on ratings. This category "encompasses institutions as well as systems and processes". Most of the criteria in this category are very general and relate to levels of democracy, the rule of law and risk of war. Some of the language is very redolent of the credible commitments paradigm, which we use to study the impact of political institutions on sovereign debt: "The stability, predictability, and transparency of a country's political institutions are important considerations". Many scholars also emphasise the political nature of sovereign debt. 3 Nonetheless, there is considerable variation in the extent to which the literature takes politics seriously.
It is possible to very roughly rank sovereign-debt studies from least to most political. Reinhart and Rogoff's seminal contribution aspires to a general explanation, but analyses sovereign default in terms of undifferentiated, unified state actors. 4 This approach is common in theoretical models 5 and in empirical research. Politics are often reduced to the history of default. 6 Tomz cleverly combines economic context and default history to show how the market can infer the preferences of a state. long-term investments. A polity's capacity for credible commitment is much more likely to be a result of historical accident rather than economic policy.
In contrast to the literature on constraint, some emphasise the need for the flexibility that a concentration of power provides. For example, there is a tradition of arguments about the importance of state strength and autonomy to economic development. 41 MacIntyre argues that constraint leads to damaging rigidity and concentration to damaging volatility. Instead, investors should have greater confidence in a political system that combines flexibility and credibility.
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MacIntyre's argument is mostly presented as a "golden mean", but he also hints that credibility and flexibility may be particularly appropriate to different policy areas.
Alternatively, the appropriateness of the two types of institutional configurations could depend on time horizons. In the short-term, concentrated political systems may have the flexibility to deal with emergencies and changing circumstances. In the longer term, concentration of power represents too great a policy risk for economic agents who would prefer credible commitment to a policy structure. In democracies, this policy risk is often crystallised in an election and a possible change of government.
Credible Commitments and Sovereign Debt
Both variants of the credible commitment argument apply to sovereign debt. The incentives of a debtor government are time-inconsistent. For example, at time point one, a government can promise to reduce the budget deficit. At time point two, its 41 Evans 1995.
42 MacIntyre 2001, 86. creditors recalculate the probability of getting their money back; demand for the debt increases; and the interest rate comes down. At time point three, the government reneges on its commitment, using the reduced interest rate to fund increased public spending, instead of a further reduction in public debt. Of course, economic agents are aware of this inconsistency and can predict that the government will renege on its promise. Since the government is not credibly committed, lenders demand a higher interest rate.
Political instability also affects the credibility of sovereign debtors. At time point one, a government can promise to reduce the budget deficit. At time point two, creditors again reduce interest rates. At time point three, the government is replaced by a new government that does not feel bound by its predecessor's commitment to control public debt and instead chooses to spend the proceeds of the lower interest rate. Again, economic agents are aware that an election might bring about a change in policy and price this into the interest rates they charge on sovereign debt. The commitment lacks credibility not because of time inconsistency but because a government at time point one cannot guarantee the policies of a government at time point three.
Political institutions can change the credibility of sovereign debtors in both types of commitment problem. In each case, institutions should affect both the preferences of government and their potential for policy change. Firstly, let us consider time inconsistency. The greater the concentration of power the greater is the incentive to renege on a commitment to control public debt. If power is concentrated in a narrow group, it can target spending at a particular group and will be less concerned about the costs a higher interest rate will impose on society as a whole. If power is shared it will be more difficult to target spending to satisfy the government's constituents and the greater will be those constituents share in the overall cost of higher interest rates.
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Also, if power is shared it will be more difficult to agree on any decision, including reneging on a commitment to control public debt. Secondly, there is political instability. The more concentrated is power the more likely it is that an election will produce a new government unconnected to the original promise to control debt.
Moreover, the more concentrated is government the easier and quicker it is to decide to renege on the previous government's commitment. Under joint power, a government would have to manage bargaining amongst coalition partners, other parties and committees in the legislature and amongst representatives of civil society.
There are other ways to think about institutions and economics. Some research on political economics employs particular institutions as their independent variables. For example, Persson and Tabellini centre their analysis on contrasts between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems and presidential and parliamentary forms of government. 44 By contrast, a focus on the dispersion of power uses a simple concept to capture a complex reality. We choose Lijphart's notion of joint power to capture the credibility of sovereign debtors. Similar ideas are very common in comparative politics. 45 Lijphart's alternative, more concrete name for joint power is the "executives-parties" dimension. We seek to identify the central tendency of the set of 43 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 87; Olson 2000, 3-6; Olson 1982 . 44 Persson and Tabellini 2005. 45 Armingeon, 2002; Powell 2000; Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 2002. institutions responsible for managing a sovereign's finances by looking at the extent to which power is shared amongst these actors.
Theories of credible commitment tend to theorise domestic economies. In these models, economic actors collect information about one polity. However, participants in the international market for sovereign debt need information about many political systems. The more political systems an investor has to analyse the less information she is likely to collect on each individual country. Presumably, this is the main reason why ratings agencies play such an important role in sovereign debt. Time-and information-poor international investors will tend to focus on the central tendency of a political system.
Ideology, Political Institutions and Sovereign Debt
The most obvious political alternative to institutions is the ideology of political competitors. The ideology of governments is one of the most popular variables in political economy research. 46 We are sceptical about the potential of government ideology to explain the credibility of sovereign debtors. To be sure, right-wing governments grant more legitimacy to markets, including international markets. Also, they are less worried about cutbacks to social programmes. For these reasons, it is imaginable that their promises would be more credible. However, such arguments tend towards identity rather than incentives. Regardless of ideology, all governments should be subject to time inconsistency. After a commitment to fiscal control, and ensuing lower rates on sovereign debt, right-wing governments may also be tempted to renege, perhaps by cutting taxes instead of increasing spending. Even more clearly, 46 Mosley 2003, 8. right-wing governments also have to face the electorate, and political instability undermines the credibility of their commitments.
The diversity, rather than the ideology, of political preferences fits much better into a credibility approach. It is another staple variable of international political economy. 47 The more diverse are political preferences, the greater the policy risk from political instability. Moreover, the diversity of preferences interacts with political institutions. The more power is shared, the greater the range of interests involved in making decisions. Control of a joint power political system is spread across the ideological spectrum and elections do not tend to bring about major changes in the distribution of power. A concentrated political system awards power to one party and the distribution of power can change radically with an election. Therefore, diversity of preferences creates a much greater policy risk in a concentrated political system.
Government ideology could interact with institutions in the same way. Differences between right and left-wing governments are likely to be much larger in concentrated than in joint-power political systems.
We will test three types of hypotheses about the influence of political institutions on sovereign debt: credible commitment hypotheses, alternative political hypotheses, and combinations of credible commitment and other political perspectives. The first three hypotheses derive from the theory of credible commitment. 
Data and Operationalization
We use a fixed effects model to test our hypotheses on a sample of 23 countries from The first variable to operationalize is the concentration power in the political system. The last two decades have seen an explosion of institutional studies in social science, including international relations, politics and economics. One approach is to select particular institutions, such as presidentialism and parliamentarism, or 48 Our models include country effects to control for the unobservable characteristics of the sample countries. We do not report year effects because our dependent variable is not driven by factors that exhibit fundamental change over the long-term. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root issues found that all of the variables are stationary. We also replicated all of our models with an alternative statistical approach: linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). Each of the alternative specifications was repeated with the AR1 correction and with (out) country-fixed effects.
The results are available on request and are little changed from our original specification.
49 Sovereign credit ratings tend to lag significantly behind market driven indicators among the advanced economies. The current crisis illustrates this well, as ratings did not react until it was well underway. Flandreau, Gaillard, and Packer 2011, show However, it is likely that the level of government debt does not have a linear effect on sovereign bond yields, so we also include the squared term. Our approach to modelling the economic determinants of interest rates is similar to a recent study by Baldacci and Kumar and also echoes that of Mosley's analysis, which argues that financial markets focus on just a few key policy indicators and are not interested in 55 Budge et al. 2001, 21. 56 Another way of assigning left-right positions to political parties is by expert survey. Unfortunately, such surveys have only been conducted at a handful of time points and are therefore less suitable for panel analysis. 57 Pontusson and Rueda 2008, 328-29 . 58 Kim and Fording 2001, 166. the wider spectrum of government policy, whereas markets seek more information on risk in developing and emerging markets. 59 We test not only a polity's overall credibility, but also the credibility of a specific commitment. Fiscal retrenchment is a stern test for any democracy. It is difficult to embark on in the first place, but, due to time-inconsistency and political instability, it is especially difficult to continue fiscal retrenchment in the medium or long-term. Of course, the ability to correct large budget deficits is vital to a state's commitment to repay its debts. A reduction in the fiscal deficit might reflect any combination of cyclical, accidental, or purposeful changes in government policy. The variable we use -consolidation -isolates only the purposeful reductions. Accordingly, we are able to test both a general argument on whether the ability to credibility commit matters, and a more nuanced argument the ability to commit specifically to deficit reduction. The 60 Devries et al. 2011. 61 This panel includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States Our findings are presented in Table 1 , the first column of which is the base specification. The next six columns present estimates which test H1-H3 and their variants on fiscal retrenchment, H1a-H3a. Accordingly, column two adds our measure of the degree to which power is concentrated in the political system and column three adds the action-based fiscal consolidation variable, and an interaction term. Column four presents estimates of the effect of ideological polarization on credibility and column five introduces the fiscal consolidation variable and an interaction with the level of ideological polarization. Column six introduces the concentration of power and ideological polarization into the same specification, and interacts both variables in order to test the hypothesis that the effect of ideological polarization should be greater where power is concentrated. Column seven includes all of the aforementioned variables and interactions in order to test the hypothesis that the effect of ideological polarization on the credibility of a commitment to fiscal retrenchment should be much greater where power is concentrated.
[TABLE 1 HERE] Unsurprisingly, the findings confirm that the level of inflation and the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP are robust predictors of the yield on sovereign debt.
Thus, the baseline model is a plausible basis on which to test our hypotheses. The models provide very strong support for our argument and confirm all credible commitment hypotheses. The degree to which power is concentrated in the political system is a strong predictor of the yield on government debt, as is the polarization of the political system. Moreover, we find that the effect of ideological polarization is greater where power is concentrated, as the interaction of polarization and the concentration of power is statistically significant. In all of the models where we have added the new action-based measure of fiscal consolidation, it predicts substantial variation in the interest rate on government bonds. Most impressively, three out of four political coefficients double in magnitude when we control for fiscal consolidation, while the fourth is almost unaffected. The political sources of credible commitment explain variations in long-term interest rates across four decades, in twenty four countries, and are robust to standard economic and financial covariates, as well as fiscal policy. The last we consider a particularly severe test of our theory.
[ 62 Figure 1 illustrates the effect of polarization on the interest rate at different levels of power concentration. It shows that a move from a dispersed system that is not ideologically polarised, to a concentrated system that is 62 The substantive effects for the concentration of power are taken from model two and the effect for ideological polarization are taken from model three (the estimates from of which are presented in Table   1 ). The substantive effects from these models are very similar to our full model (model seven).
very polarized pushes up the yield on sovereign debt. The substantive effect is dramatic: a move from the most polarized and concentrated system to one that is the least polarised and where power is most dispersed would save 7.26 percent. If a sovereign debtor were to continue to rollover a dollar at this higher rate for ten years, it would have to pay an additional dollar for the privilege. Such a move would probably disqualify a sovereign from borrowing altogether. Figure 2 illustrates a similar effect: it shows that ideology matters the more power is concentrated in the political system. And furthermore, it shows that the confidence intervals narrow significantly at higher levels of power concentration, meaning that estimates at higher levels of concentration are more reliable. examines whether the ideology of governments makes a difference. In the first column, we find no support for the hypothesis that the concentration of power has a non-linear effect on market perceptions of risk. The variable representing this concept is statistically significant but incorrectly signed. In other words, we reject MacIntyre's argument that the markets do not trust excessively concentrated or dispersed power, but prefer a golden mean. The second column presents estimates on an alternative dependent variable: the short-term interest rate on government bonds. Our purpose here is to test the argument that concentrated systems should be charged lower shortterm interest rates, while dispersed systems should be charged lower long-term rates. 63 The supposed decisiveness of concentrated systems may be more credible in 63 MacIntyre 2001. the short term, even if it is less credible in the long term. The data rejects this hypothesis. The coefficient on power concentration is even larger and runs in the same direction as in the models where the long-term rate is the dependent variable.
Ideology, Political Institutions and Sovereign Debt
[ The estimates in column three reject the argument that government ideology affects interest rates. Ideology is not statistically significant at conventional levels but it is correctly signed, showing that a move to the right is associated with a reduction in the interest rate. Although ideology per se is not driving the yield on government bonds, it is possible that it interacts with the degree to which power is concentrated.
Here, we find some evidence that this is true as the interaction of ideology and the concentration of power, in column four, is statistically significant and the coefficient in the right direction. Markets appear to prefer right-wing governments when they are sufficiently free to exercise power. These alternative hypotheses perform weakly in comparison to the centrality of joint power institutions in credibly committing sovereigns to repay their debts. Table 3 interest rates across the region. 65 Governments that were once less credible in the eyes of the market enjoyed lower rates in the run-up to, and in the new era of, the euro.
Robustness Checks
They imported credibility and capital from the region's stronger economies. Even governments outside of the European Union benefitted from the credibility-enhancing effects of integration, as closing a negotiation chapter of the accession process is associated with lower spreads on sovereign debt. 66 We are interested in whether our explanation holds among these countries, even during a period when many could borrow extensively at very low rates.
To test the robustness of our argument in light of European integration we have restricted the sample to the original 11 members of EMU and performed an analysis 66 Gray 2009. 67 The sign on the concentration of power is in the wrong direction in these models but we do not interpret this as significant because it is a lower order term in our interaction. and the fiscal balance do not predict variation in interest rates. It appears that when governments make joint political commitments, their individual economic characteristics are much less important to market actors, but the credibility of their individual political systems still matters.
The second set of changes to our original specification is that we have substituted decision-making authority, it nevertheless allows us to subject our analysis to further rigorous testing using an alternative variable that captures roughly both of our explanatory variables. We find that the coefficient on Henisz's index runs in the expected direction and is statistically significant. Our results are not an artefact of our measure of institutional configuration.
[ TABLE 3 HERE.] In the final set of changes to our base model, we re-evaluate our finding on the role of government ideology by substituting our original measure of ideology with an 68 Henisz 2002. alternative measure from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
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We derived several new variables to capture ideology from this source, including dummy variables that indicate the presence of right-wing and left-wing government.
We also repeated each specification with a variable to capture a change in government, rather than the starting value. Our findings show that government ideology is a poor predictor of variation in interest rates with one exception: a change in government ideology towards the right, using our original measure of the concept derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project, is associated with a significant reduction in the yield on sovereign debt. None of the binary variables from the DPI were statistically significant. Thus, on the balance of evidence, the role of ideology is less important than more durable aspects of the political system. While there is some evidence pointing to the importance of ideology, unlike our credible commitments argument, it is not robust to an alternative measure of the independent variable.
We also performed a series of further robustness checks which are not presented in this article but are available on request:
First, a lagged dependent variable (LDV) was added to our main specification.
Due to the well-documented problems associated with the use of a LDV, 70 we are skeptical of the validity of the coefficients as the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, one of the main predictors of the interest rate, is no longer significant at conventional levels. The only variables which attain significance are inflation and our political variables. 69 We used the GOV1RLC indicator from the DPI, which captures the largest governing party's ideology as right, left, or center. 70 Achen 2000.
Second, we included the short-term interest rate on government bonds as an additional covariate. Like a lagged dependent variable, once it is included the model explains a much higher percentage of variation. And again we are reluctant to interpret the coefficients for the same reason, but our political variables still attain significance at conventional levels.
Third, we dropped the United States as an observation and used the rate on US Treasury Bills (T-Bills) as a control variable. Arguably, the interest rate on US government debt is of systemic importance and should enter the specification on the left-hand-side. 71 We found that the rate is statistically significant in all of our specifications; however, our main finding is robust. There is also reason to be skeptical on the use of US T-Bills as a control variable among the advanced economies specifically, as other government debt is considered as safe, if not more so, than US government debt.
Finally, we replicated our main specifications with a new dependent variable: the difference between the rate on US T-bills and other government debt, also known as the 'spread'. The spread enters as a natural log so that the data conform to the normal distribution. Again, our argument is robust but there are some notable differences between the determinants of the spread and general interest rates. For one, action-based fiscal consolidation is not a statistically significant predictor of the spread, whereas it is a strong predictor of the interest rate. Moreover, the concentration of power is not statistically significant and the level of polarization is only significant at the ten percent level. When interacted, however, the variables are significant at conventional levels. 71 We also repeated the specification with the squared term, as a low US interest rate might signal turbulence, as markets take flight to the safety of US treasury bills.
Conclusion
Sovereign debt is a vital feature of international political economy, which has gained even greater prominence during the ongoing global economic and political crisis, most obviously in Europe. Yet, the politics of sovereign debt in the advanced economies has received less attention among scholars of international relations. In particular, the question of how basic political structures influence long-term interest rates in the advanced economies has gone unanswered. This is especially important given that sovereigns, unlike other debtors, can choose not to pay. Their credibility as debtors depends on political choice. In this paper, we focus on the broad characteristics of political institutions. In doing so, our approach is consistent with a major strand of economic theory and with rating agencies' emphasis on long-term risk. Our two key variables are the polarization of the party-system on the classic leftright dimension of economic ideology and the relative concentration of power within the executive and party system. When polarisation is low and power is shared, markets perceive a highly credible commitment to pay back debt. In other words, the risk of policy change, introducing the possibility of non-payment of debts, is low. Our calculations show that constrained political institutions can save countries a fortune in interest payments. Our results clearly reject hypotheses that predict more credible commitments from flexible institutions and are somewhat ambiguous regarding government ideology.
Several contemporary proposals seek to boost the credibility of sovereigns with debt problems. These proposals target fiscal management by introducing fiscal councils, constitutional rules on balanced budgets and constitutional debt brakes. If a polity has a fundamentally credible political structure, because of power sharing and low polarization, such innovations are unlikely to boost credibility much further. In less credible political systems, commitments to obey fiscal rules may be threatened by the same time inconsistency and political instability problems that undermine promises to repay debt. A fiscal rule may be introduced at time point one in a sovereign debt crisis; reduce interest rates at time point two; and be reneged upon at time point three. Of course, markets will anticipate this process, keeping yields high.
The issue is whether such rules will be mere policy commitments or fundamental policy constraints. In the longer term, such rules can be grafted on to systems of concentrated power and polarized competition. However, in the short term, such policies are likely to be interpreted as fundamental shifts in fiscal policy.
Unfortunately, the prescription arising from our research is fundamental political change, not policy tinkering. Such changes are rare because elites are usually loath to change a system under which they have become elites and institutional innovations seem alien to established political cultures. The UK's recent rejection of a new voting system is a typical example, but the fundamental change in New Zealand's political system in the 1990s show that wholesale changes can and do take place. In the midst of a sovereign debt crisis, exhortations to fundamentally change political systems exhibit a good understanding of the problem, together with a desperate awareness of how hard it is to fix. An excellent illustration is European leaders' call on Greece's opposition to emulate their Irish and Portuguese counterparts and support the government's austerity drive, even though the Greek parties are polarized and power is concentrated.
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